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Abstract—In most European settings, record linkage across
different institutions is based on encrypted personal identifiers –
such as names, birthdays, or places of birth – to protect privacy.
However, in practice up to 20% of the records may contain
errors in identifiers. Thus, exact record linkage on encrypted
identifiers usually results in the loss of large subsets of the
data. Such losses usually imply biased statistical estimates since
the causes of errors might be correlated with the variables of
interest in many applications. Over the past 10 years, the field
of Privacy Preserving Record Linkage (PPRL) has developed
different techniques to link data without revealing the identity of
the described entity. However, only few techniques are suitable
for applied research with large data bases that include millions
of records, which is typical for administrative or medical data
bases. Bloom filters were found to be one successful technique
for PPRL when large scale applications are concerned.
Yet, Bloom filters have been subject to cryptographic attacks.
Previous research has shown that the straight application of
Bloom filters has a non-zero re-identification risk. We present
new results on recently developed techniques defying all known
attacks on PPRL Bloom filters. The computationally inexpensive
algorithms modify personal identifiers by combining different
cryptographic techniques. The paper demonstrates these new
algorithms and demonstrates their performance concerning pre-
cision, recall, and re-identification risk on large data bases.
I. BACKGROUND
Linking information on the same micro-unit (persons, in-
stitutions, patents) across different data bases is an increas-
ingly important task for administrative and research purposes.
Applications can be found in census operations, the health
sector, national security, crime detection and prevention [1],
official statistics [2] and social science research [3]. However,
most applications of record linkage involve information on
natural persons. Under many jurisdictions (for example, most
European countries), no unique personal identification number
is available for Record Linkage. Therefore, Record Linkage
has to use unstable and error-prone identifiers such as names
or addresses.
Real-world identifiers may show error rates of more than
20% [4]. Examples of these errors include missing or addi-
tionally inserted letters, swapped letters, or completely missing
attribute values [5].
In most legal settings, names and other personal identifiers
have to be encrypted before data linkage across different data
sets provided by independent data holders is permitted. This
is especially true if potentially sensitive information (health
information, criminal records, financial debts) is concerned.
Encrypting unreliable identifiers with standard crypto-
graphic methods such as keyed HMACs (Hash Message
Authentication Code [6] i.e. SHA-256 or MD5) would result
in missing links. From a statistical point of view, unlinked
records result in a missing data problem [7]. If a true link is
missed, but the link is crucial for variables of interest, this
is referred to as differential linkage error [8], [9]. Hence,
a differential linkage error may result in biased estimates
of causal effects and population parameters [10], [11]. The
most straight-forward way to reduce differential linkage bias
is improving the linkage rate. This problem has given rise to
the field of privacy preserving record linkage (PPRL). Over the
last decade, an increasing number of publications proposing
novel PPRL methods have been published [12]. However, few
of the proposed techniques are suitable for large scale linkage
operations under the restrictions described above [13].
One method using Bloom filters [14] for error-tolerant
privacy preserving record linkage [15] has been applied in
several different research settings [16], [17],
Although the results on Bloom filter-based PPRL are
promising, security concerns remain. So far, four studies by
two research groups have been published on attacking PPRL
Bloom filters [13]:
The first study [18] attacked basic Bloom filters with a
constraint-satisfaction solver (CSS) to assign records to the
frequency count given by a voter registration list. Although
the technical details of the attack remain unclear it seems to
be a variant of what is now being described as a simple rank
swapping attack [19].
The second article [20] used composite Bloom filters with
the same CSS attack. The authors consider their attack as
hardly successful. However, both articles seem to show that
basic Bloom filter encodings can be aligned with frequency
distributions of unencoded identifiers. This way of attack is
impossible if unique encodings can be achieved, for example
by using salted encodings [21]. It should be noted, that the
CSS attack is based on the entire Bloom filter, therefore it
is no decoding, but an alignment. In contrast to that, [21],
[22] attempt the decoding (actual revealing of all identifiers
as clear text) by a cryptanalysis of individual bit patterns
within the Bloom filters. While [21] were successful with
basic Bloom filters, [22] demonstrated partial success with
composite Bloom filters. Details of these attacks will be given
in section II-A.
To prevent their own attack, [21] suggested the use of
different hash functions (random hashing), but this proposal
has not been tested so far. Testing this proposal and suggesting
two additional techniques for preventing attacks on Bloom
filters is subject of this paper.
A. Our contribution
Random hashing has been suggested by [21], but has not
been tested in an attack. We report on applying the crypt-
analysis method of [21] on random hashing and compare the
results of this attack on two new techniques (Balanced Bloom
Filters, BLIP/RAPPOR) suggested here for the first time for
PPRL. We simulate the performance of these techniques by
comparing them to the current standard practice of Bloom
filter-based PPRL in terms of linkage quality and privacy
metrics.
B. Outline of the paper
Section II explains the construction of Bloom filters [15]
and composite Bloom filters (CLKs [23]) based on the double
hashing scheme [24]. Then, the only known attack on bit
patterns within a Bloom filter [21] is described in section II-A.
The following section describes three methods to prevent
this attack. The performance of these techniques is studied
with regard to linkage quality in section II-D and with regard
to privacy metrics in section II-G. We conclude by summing
up the current recommendations for Bloom filter-based PPRL.
II. METHODS
Bloom filters storing one identifier as proposed by [15] have
been subject to cryptographic attacks [18], [21]. To reduce
the filter’s vulnerability to cryptographic attacks [23] have
proposed storing all identifiers in a single Bloom filter. These
are then called Cryptographic Long-term Keys (CLKs). To
build a CLK of all identifiers, each identifier is divided into
n-grams. For instance, the last name MILLER, is split into
bigrams and would thus yield a vector of n-grams contain-
ing _M,MI,IL,LL,LE,ER,R_. To store each n-gram in a
Bloom filter (that initially consists only of zeroes) with the
length l, the original CLKs used the double hashing scheme
[24], where k positions in the Bloom filter are set to a value
of one. The individual bit positions hi are then determined by
the sum of the integer representations of two different hash
functions f and g of the n-gram (the original implementation
used SHA-1 and MD5) which are mapped to the length of the
Bloom filter l:
hi = (f + i · g) mod l.
[21] have developed an attack on the resulting bit patterns
for this particular scheme exploiting the circumstance that the
amount of possible outcomes of the double hashing scheme
is very limited. This attack is described in more detail in the
following section.
A. Bit pattern attack details
To attack CLKs, [21] only use n = 2-grams (bigrams) with
additional attribute information appended (e.g. ’surname:ER’
and ’name:ER’ to differentiate between an ’ER’ as a part of a
surname or part of a first name). k = 20 hash functions were
used to map all bigrams to the Bloom filters with a length
of l = 1000, applying the double hashing scheme described
above. The resulting bit pattern of a single bigram is called
an atom, which is set to one for up to k bit positions.
Subsequently, a systematic search of all theoretically pos-
sible atom patterns is conducted. These patterns are limited,
because either some of these patterns are impossible to achieve
(as no bigram can be mapped) or they collide due to different
f - and g-values. The patterns are used to build a matrix D,
which contains the empirical relative frequencies of each atom
in the masked data set (the CLK data). A second matrix E
consists of the relative frequencies of the bigram combinations
over all identifiers from a non-encoded training data set, i.e.
unencrypted clear-text data.
The Jakobsen-algorithm [25] is then used to minimize the
distance between the matrices D and E. The frequency analy-
sis thus determines the correlation between known bigrams and
unknown atoms. The algorithm provides a vector containing
bigrams that are rearranged in the order of the atoms. In order
to determine the maximal similarity assigning the attributes,
a list of known names is then sorted in descending order of
frequencies, converted into bigrams, and compared using the
Dice-coefficient [26].
Finally, we compare the atoms found by the CLK (which
are related to a known bigram by the Jakobsen-algorithm [25])
with the personal attributes of a reference list. The assigned
value of personal attributes is considered as successfully
decoded, if this value matches the personal attribute value of
the plain text perfectly. Correspondingly, the decoding rate
is defined as the percentage of assigned attribute values that
precisely match.
B. Methods to prevent attacks
1) Random hashing: To replace the double hashing scheme
with random hashing, k random numbers are drawn for every
possible bigram. In comparison to double hashing with k = 20
hash functions approximately 1041 instead of 106 different
combinations are theoretically possible. Thus, we do not apply
hash functions, as a systematic search requires considerably
more computational power and time.
First, the universe of all possible n-grams is constructed
separately for each identifier. For each possible n-gram, k
random numbers between 1 and the length of the Bloom filter
l are drawn with replacements by using a single password as
a seed. For each n-gram, k random positions are then set to
one in the Bloom filter. This way, the hash functions are no
longer required and a pattern-based attack will be much more
difficult.
2) Balanced Bloom Filters: Since many attacks are based
on the Hamming weight of a Bloom filter, data sets with
Hamming weight distribution closer to a uniform distribution
810
12
14
16
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06
 f
e
Fig. 1. Privacy level ǫ dependent on the bit flipping probability f . Lower
values of ǫ denote a higher privacy level.
are more difficult to attack than data sets with non-uniform
distributions. Of course, data sets with constant Hamming
weights for all Bloom filters would be optimal in this regard.
Codes with constant Hamming weights are known as balanced
codes [27], [28].
Therefore, we suggest the use of Balanced Bloom filters with
constant Hamming weight for PPRL. Balanced Bloom filters
can be constructed by concatenating a Bloom filter with length
l with a negated copy of the same Bloom filter. The resulting
bit array of length 2 ∗ l has to be permuted. This approach
seems to prevent all attacks based on Hamming weights of
Bloom filters.1 It should be noted that the increased length
of Balanced Bloom filters and their constant hamming weight
increases computing time and – for some blocking methods –
the required memory.
3) Permanent Randomized Response CLKs (BLIP): To in-
crease the level of differential privacy [30], [31] and to cover
the CLKs in a way that it is impossible for deterministic
attacks to be carried out, we implemented the RAPPOR
technique [32], which was first proposed for Bloom filters in
[30] (as BLIP (for BLoom-and-flIP)). This allows us to use
randomized responses in order to flip the values of random bit
positions. The permanent randomized response satisfies ǫinf -
differential privacy [33] if
ǫinf = 2k ln
(
1− 1
2
f
1
2
f
)
where k is the number of hash functions and f is the
probability of switching one bit (see Figure 1).
To implement the randomized response with a Bloom filter
of the length l, each bit position Bi is treated with a random-
1If the Hamming weights of column of the resulting data set of Balanced
Bloom filters vary and all rows are identically permuted, a reversal of the
balancing might be possible by finding unique pairs of columns (this idea is
due to [29]). To make the success of this attack highly unlikely, a different
permutation based on an error-free identifier should be used.
f
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
k
10
20
30
40
50
F−Score
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
● ● ● ● ●●●● ●●● ●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●●
●●
●●●●●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●●●
●●●●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●●
●●
●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●●
●●
●●●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●●●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●●●●
●●●
●
●●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●● ●●● ●● ●● ●● ●●
●
●
●
●
Fig. 2. F-Scores of BLIP CLKs dependent on bit-flipping probabilities f
and the number of hash functions k. f -values between 0.02 and 0.04 are
unproblematic, depending on the number of hash functions used. More hash
functions tolerate higher values of f .
ized response, which then provides us with the new bit value
B
′
i :
B
′
i =


1 with probability 1
2
f
0 with probability 1
2
f
Bi with probability 1− f
.
This way, the new parameter f is the chance of flipping a bit
at each bit position of the Bloom filter. To simulate the effect
of BLIP on CLKs, we tested f -values ranging from 0.01 to 0.2
using k different numbers of hash functions. Figure 2 shows
the F-Scores for several different PRR parameters we have
tested. For all following calculations, k = 20 hash functions
and a flipping-probability of f = 0.02 were applied. Note
that f = 0.02 does not guarantee a sufficient level of differ-
ential privacy (see Figure 1) [30]. Still, deterministic attacks
are countervailed, while the privacy levels are approximately
increased by a factor of two (since ǫ is nearly halved).
4) Balanced BLIP: For analysis, we also combined BLIP
with balanced codes by applying the balanced code first and
using the randomized response on the resulting balanced CLK
next. We used f = 0.02 as for the BLIP CLKs.
C. Data
The data set used to assess the quality measures of the
record linkage (see section II-F) was generated by indepen-
dently sampling surnames, names, and sex from a large ad-
ministrative data base. Dates of birth were sampled uniformly.
An error generator was used on a copy of the resulting data file
with n = 10.000 records, creating at least one error (swapping,
replacement, inserts, deletions) in approximately 20% of the
rows. The error-free and erroneous files were used to create
different alternative Bloom filters, which were finally linked
using Multibit trees (see section II-D).
For the bit pattern attack and the calculation of the privacy
metrics, we used a second data set. Training data including
n = 1.000.000 entries containing surnames, first names,
dates of birth, and birthplaces was created with an attribute
frequency distribution that was similar to a large administrative
data base. For privacy reasons, the attributes of the adminis-
trative data base were stored separately and contained only
the absolute frequencies. Approximately 680.000 different
first names, 400.000 different surnames, and 10.400 different
locations were sampled independently from the population
data base. The resulting sample therefore approximates the
population distribution closely. This close approximation is
necessary for the bit pattern attack, as the quality of the
training data is important for decoding. However, in a real-life
attack, the assumption of very similar frequency distributions
in both data sets is unlikely to hold.
D. Linkage
The two data files described in Section II-C were encrypted
using the five methods mentioned in the previous section
(Standard CLK, CLK with random hashing, BLIP, Balanced
CLK, and Balanced BLIP). The resulting Bloom filters were
linked using Multibit trees [34]. Multibit trees were used to
construct “leaves”. This was achieved by finding those bit
positions, where approximately half of the records’ bits were
set to one and the other half of the records’ bits were set to
zero. This process was repeated until only a few records in
each leaf were left – we limited this to three.
Using the information of the match bits, a maximum
Tanimoto-similarity between all leaves of a Tree and a can-
didate Bloom filter could be estimated before we computed
similarity. Following this strategy allowed us to exclude a large
number of records from the search space. The threshold for
the lowest possible Tanimoto-similarity is user-defined. The
Tanimoto coefficient T is a similarity measure for bit vectors,
which is defined as
T (A,B) =
A ∧B
A ∨B
for two bit vectors A and B. A value of T = 1 represents
perfectly matching vectors. Lowering the admitted minimal
similarity threshold allows tolerating more errors between
two vectors, but it may lead to an increase in false positive
classifications (see II-F).
E. Implementation details
This paper analyses the decoding rate of the bit pattern
attack, different privacy measures, and the quality of record
linkage. Privacy measures were assessed using R 3.3.0, all
encoding variants were handled using an R-Package (PPRL)
developed by our research group. The attack was implemented
in Python 2.7 and C++. Linkage was done with R using a
Multibit-tree.
F. Linkage quality measures
To assess the linkage quality, the standard record linkage
criteria (precision, recall, and F-score) were used. Recall is
defined as the number of true positive matches divided by
the number of factual pairs, including pairs that were falsely
classified as non-matches (false negatives fn):
Recall =
tp
tp+ fn
.
The higher the recall, the better are record pairs found by
a given linkage procedure. Precision is defined as the number
of correctly classified pairs (true positive classifications tp)
divided by the number of all classified pairs (tp and false
positives fp):
Precision =
tp
tp+ fp
.
The higher the precision, the less likely is the false classifi-
cation of potential pairs as matches. Finally, F-score is defined
as the harmonic mean of recall and precision:
F-score =
2 · Recall · Precision
Recall+ Precision
.
All measures range from zero to one.
G. Privacy Metrics
We evaluated various measures of privacy, calculated mutual
information (MI) and entropy as well as the probability of
suspicion (Ps) metrics [35]. Additional information, such as
entropy and the number of unique bit patterns, were also
included. In contrast to [36], we calculated mutual information
on logarithms base 2 instead of base 10, so the units of entropy
are bits. Encoded plain texts were used as the masked data
set. Our training data set was used as the global (reference,
in encoded form) data set. Both data sources are described in
section II-C.
1) Mutual information and relative information gain:
Mutual information (MI) was computed as
MI = (H(X) +H(Y ))−H(X,Y )
where H(X) is the entropy of the clear text variables and
H(Y ) is the entropy of the corresponding encrypted field (the
CLKs). These are calculated as
H(X) = −
n∑
i=1
P (xi) logP (xi)
and
H(Y ) = −
m∑
i=1
P (yj) logP (yj).
Furthermore, the entropy of the encrypted field (i.e. CLK
entropy) together with the file size of the masked data set nm
are used to calculate the mean entropy (ME) for each variation
of the encryption:
ME =
1
nm
H(Y ).
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For the calculation of the mutual information (MI), the joint
entropy was computed by
H(X,Y ) = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
P (xi, yj) logP (xi, yj).
Based on the mutual information criterion, the relative
information gain (RIG) was calculated by
RIG =
MI
H(X)
.
2) Probability of suspicion: To calculate the probability
of suspicion (Ps) [35], we had to classify the result of the
linkage of the encrypted global and masked data set first.
As no true pair shared the same IDs, true positive matches
could be classified easily: if the IDs of the positively classified
pairs matched, a true positive pair (TP) was identified. If the
pairs did not match, a false positive (FP) was recorded. The
difference between the true positives and the actual number of
pairs then represents the number of mismatched pairs (false
negatives, FN).
With the known number of true positives (TP) and the file
size of the masked data (nm), the probability of suspicion
was calculated for each record as
Ps =
1
TP
−
1
nm
(1− 1
nm
)
.
III. RESULTS
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show F-Scores, recall, and precision for
each variation of the encryption.
Changing the encryption scheme from double hashing to
random hashing showed no change in any of the linkage qual-
ity measures. Introducing BLIP with a bit-flipping probability
of f = 0.02 slightly reduced the F-Score for the standard CLK
and the CLK with balanced codes. In addition, balancing the
CLKs displayed a marginal increase in linkage quality as a
result of improved recall measures.
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The BLIP results are in line with the results from adding
random bits to Bloom filters [13]. However, using bit flipping
changed both zeroes and ones with a probability of f
2
, while
random bits only added a limited number of ones. It has to be
noted that all BLIP CLKs show zero true positive matches
(consequently, the F-scores, precision, and recall measures
have a value of zero) when restricting the Multibit trees to
a Tanimoto-similarity of one. However, this is not surprising,
as a Tanimoto-similarity requires an exact match, which is
highly unlikely when flipping random bits of each record with
a probability of f = 0.02.
On the basis of the suggested Tanimoto-threshold of 0.85
[13], all proposed modifications yielded similar results as
the reference CLK (double hashing scheme, k = 20 hash
functions, l = 1000). Any of the methods tested here detected
90-95% of all true record pairs with F-scores between 0.947
to 0.969.
Table I presents the decoding rates for each variation using
the attack by [22], privacy metrics, entropy, and number of
unique bit patterns in the data.
The results show that the published attack fails when
introducing random hashing. The decoding rate dropped to
zero for all methods except for the reference double hashing
CLK. The attack is unsuccessful when the number of atoms
is too low (< 300) to deduce bigrams from the bit patterns.
All privacy metrics (Ps, RIG, MI) are constant for all
methods. This is due to the fact that all bit patterns are unique
in the CLK encrypted data. The linkage attack yielded no
feasible results, with a probability of suspicion (Ps) of zero.
Finally, the metrics were unable to predict the decoding rate
using the bit pattern attack.
IV. DISCUSSION
The findings reported demonstrate that it is possible to
achieve good results with Privacy Preserving Record Linkage
even under very strict privacy jurisdictions. Neither precision
nor recall suffer substantially when any of the proposed
techniques are applied.
Frequency attacks require very frequent combinations of
identifiers that are not observed in our sample of a hun-
dred thousand records. For most applications, this number
of records is not exceeded at all or least not within a block
formed by identifiers used for salting. Since the use of CLKs
alone produces unique patterns for each unique combination
of identifiers, in such settings frequency attacks are impossible
on entire bit patterns (CLKs). In such situations, the privacy
metrics suggested by the PPRL literature [35], such as MI or
Ps, are useless as they always result in constant values.
Currently, the only known attack remaining [21] is the
identification of bit patterns within a Bloom filter. Applying
the decoding algorithms described by Niedermeyer [21] and
modified by [22], yielded no successful decoding of bit
patterns for any of the newly suggested encoding methods
described here. Although random hashing by itself prevents
the Niedermeyer attack, a combination of random hashing
with balancing codes prohibits any attack based on Hamming
weights, including attacks that are – to date – unknown. BLIP
or RAPPOR, respectively, is intended to guarantee differential
privacy. However, the probability of bit flipping required for
conventional privacy levels is too high to be applied to CLKs
in order to successfully link records. Therefore, BLIP with
lower probabilities of bit flipping should be considered as a
variant of random bits as suggested by [15] and discussed
by [13]. BLIPs advantage is RRT masking of the bit by either
reporting 0 or 1, instead of randomly inserting 1s. BLIP should
make deterministic attacks on frequent sub-patterns harder and
increases the number of unique full bit patterns. By increasing
the number of unique patterns, any frequency attack requires
larger data bases or block sizes to be successful. Using a data
set with n = 100.000 records, we have demonstrated that
combining BLIP and balancing codes with random hashing
prevents all known attacks.
V. CONCLUSION
To sum up the current state of Bloom filter-based PPRL,
and considering the results reported here, we recommend:
1) The use of as any many [37] stable [38] identifiers as
available,
2) avoiding the use of padding [13],
3) limiting the length of identifiers [13],
4) using random hashing instead of double hashing,
5) using balanced and RRT Bloom filters,
6) using a stable identifier for salting [21],
7) linking Bloom filters using Multibit trees [39], [40].
Studying the impact of these modifications in real-world
settings is subject of ongoing research of our group. Further-
more, we are implementing all Bloom filter-based techniques
in an upcoming R-library.
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